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Abstract
In this document we summarize our research efforts related to computational interpretation of two
basic immune mechanisms: co-stimulation and priming. This interpretation was done in the scope
of misbehavior detection for ad hoc wireless networks. When formulating co-stimulation and prim-
ing as a computational approach we abstracted away from the molecular nature of these mecha-
nisms. Instead we concentrated on their logic structure. Needless to say, despite applying such a
simplified view, the path to a useful computational interpretation was not straightforward. This fact
underscores the conceptual character of our research.
Our computational interpretation of co-stimulation allows any detection system to introduce
two desirable properties: energy efficiency and false positives control. Additionally, it introduces
the option to exchange energy efficiency for misbehavior detection rate, while keeping the false
positives rate unchanged. Priming enables to check whether network operational conditions are
within the limits prescribed by priming thresholds. Since priming is based on co-stimulation, it
inherits the same properties.
We provide a summary of the challenges related to the design of co-stimulation and priming
based architectures. We argue that co-stimulation and priming are rather general paradigms with
possible applications in other areas than misbehavior detection. Additionally, we summarize our
results related to the efficiency of negative selection in misbehavior detection scenarios. We outline
the key features of AIS-Lib, a library for performance evaluation of immune inspired detection sys-
tems. Finally, we summarize our results achieved by applying a locality sensitive hashing technique
to intrusion detection.
Zusammenfassung
In diesem Dokument fassen wir unsere Forschungsergebnisse zum Thema Fehlverhaltenerkennung
fu¨r drahtlose ad-hoc Netze zusammen, welche sich auf zwei grundlegende Mechanismen des biolo-
gischen Immunsystems (Co-stimulation und Priming) beziehen. In diesem Zusammenhang wurde
eine ausfu¨hrliche Analyse und Interpretation der beiden Mechanismen durchgefu¨hrt, um sie erfolg-
reich im Bereich der Fehlverhaltenerkennung einzusetzen. Bei der Formulierung geeigneter In-
terpretationen der molekularen Grundlagen (zur Umsetzung in ein technisches System) haben wir
uns auf die logische Struktur der beiden Mechanismen konzentriert. Trotz der Verwendung einer
auf diese Weise vereinfachten Ansicht, war der Weg zu einer nu¨tzlichen Umsetzung nicht direkt.
Dieser Sachverhalt unterstreicht den Konzeptcharakter unserer Forschung.
Unsere Umsetzung von Co-stimulation und Priming ermo¨glicht jedem Fehlverhaltenerkennung-
system zwei wichtige Eigenschaften einzufu¨hren: Steuerung der Energieeffizienz und Minimierung
der Anzahl von Falschmeldungen. Zusa¨tzlich bietet sich die Mo¨glichkeit, Energieeffizienz gegen
Fehlverhaltenaufkla¨rungsrate auszutauschen, dabei bleibt aber die Anzahl von Falschmeldungen
konstant. Priming ermo¨glicht zu u¨berpru¨fen, ob die Betriebsbedingungen eines ad-hoc Netzwerkes
innerhalb eines eingegrenzten Bereiches bleiben. Diese Begrenzungen werden durch ”priming”-
Schwellen (Schwellwerte) definiert. Da Priming auf Co-stimulation basiert, besitzt es die gleichen
grundlegenden Eigenschaften wie Co-stimulation.
Wir geben eine Zusammenfassung unserer Forschungsergebnisse, welche sich mit den Proble-
men und Herausforderungen bezgl. Architekturen die Co-stimulation and Priming verwenden, be-
fassen. Zusa¨tzlich fassen wir unsere Forschungsergebnisse zusammen, die sich auf die Leistungs-
fa¨higkeit der negativen Selektion in Bereich der Fehlverhaltenerkennungszenarien beziehen. Wir
geben weiterhin einen U¨berblick u¨ber AIS-Lib, einer Bibliothek zur Leistungsbewertung von immun-
inspirierten Fehlverhaltenerkennungsystemen. Schließlich fassen wir unsere Forschungsergebnisse
zusammen, die sich auf Umsetzung von einem ”locality preserving” Hashingverfahren zur Erken-
nung von Einbru¨chen in ein Netzwerk (intrusion detection) beziehen.
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1 Introduction
The Biological immune system (BIS) protects its host against extraneous agents that could cause
harm. The BIS can be found in living organisms ranging from plants to vertebrates. Even though
the BIS complexity in these various life forms can be very different, the common goal is to sustain
survival in often unforeseeable conditions. The BIS can be succinctly described as a protection
system that is based both on prior experience possibly accumulated over an evolutionary time span
and short-term adaptation that occurs during the lifetime of the host. Whereas for example plants
only rely on the former type of protection, innate immunity, more complex life forms additionally
employ the latter type, adaptive immunity. It is however important to note that the existence of
adaptive immunity, its internal mechanisms and interplay with innate immunity is also a result of
evolutionary priming.
Due to the efficiency in protecting its host, the BIS has become an inspiration for designing
protection systems. Besides this area, it has become an inspiration in areas such as machine learning,
optimization, scheduling etc. Artificial Immune Systems (AISs), the technical counterpart of the
BIS, have become an independent research direction within the field of computational intelligence.
Computer and network security is an area which gained an increased interest, mainly due to the
omnipresence of the Internet. It is the role of secure protocols to guarantee data integrity and user
authentication. Unfortunately, flaws in secure protocols are continuously being found and exploited
as the Internet experience shows [45]. The history of security of home and small mobile computing
platforms points out that such attacks can disrupt or even completely interrupt the normal operations
of networks [43]. There are several thousand families of viruses and worms recorded. Some of these
families consist of several thousands or even tens of thousand viruses that were created by virus kits,
a specialized software aimed at automated virus creation.
Ad hoc wireless networks do not rely on any centralized or fixed infrastructure. Instead each
participating wireless device acts as a router for forwarding data packets. The advantage of such an
architecture is the ease of deployment. This advantage is however at the cost of a more complex
maintenance. Additionally, in many scenarios it is expected that the participating wireless devices
will be resource restricted due to their reliance on battery power. This further implicates energy
aware hardware with a lesser computational throughput.
The above limitations establish the basic motivation for designing autonomous detection and
response systems that aim at offering an additional line of defense to the employed secure protocols.
Such systems should provide several layers of functionality including the following [16]:
(i) distributed energy efficient self-learning and self-tuning with the aspiration to minimize the
need for human intervention and maintenance,
(ii) active response with focus on attenuation and possibly elimination of negative effects of mis-
behavior on the network.
In the following we will introduce the basic concepts of an energy efficient misbehavior detec-
tion system for ad hoc wireless networks. This approach is inspired by the role of co-stimulation
and priming in the BIS. We will also discuss the role of features necessary for misbehavior detec-
tion. A feature in our context is understood to be a performance measure that allows for an efficient
reasoning about whether a node misbehaves or works normally.
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Document Organization
The rest of this document is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give a short overview of the
BIS. We introduce co-stimulation and priming, and describe their role in the BIS. We also explain
how the innate and adaptive immune systems cooperate when detecting a pathogen. In Section 3 we
review the related work that used co-stimulation as a means for improving misbehavior detection
performance. Additionally, we review the state-of-the-art in the area of misbehavior detection. In
Section 4 we discuss our computational interpretation of co-stimulation and priming. In Section 5
we provide details on our co-stimulation algorithm and in Section 6 on our priming algorithm. In
Section 7 we give an overview of our experimental methodology and give insights on the perfor-
mance of co-stimulation and priming. In Section 8 we summarize our results. In Section 9 we give
concluding remarks. We also argue that co-stimulation and priming are rather general paradigms
with possible applications in other areas than misbehavior detection. Finally, Section 10 provides a
list of enclosed documents.
2 The Biological Immune System
The Biological immune system (BIS) of vertebrates is a remarkable defense system, able to
quickly recognize the presence of foreign microorganisms and thereafter eliminate these pathogens.
Pathogens are common microorganisms such as viruses, bacteria, fungi or parasites. When con-
fronted with a pathogen, the BIS often relies on a coordinated response from both of its two vital
parts:
• the innate system: the innate immune system is able to recognize the presence of a pathogen
or tissue injury, and is able to signal this to the adaptive immune system.
• the adaptive system: the adaptive immune system can develop during the lifetime of its host
a specific set of immune responses and provide immunological memory. An immunological
memory serves as a basis for a stronger immune response, should a pathogen re-exposure
happen.
2.1 Co-stimulation and Priming
The form and amplitude of immune responses is pathogen dependent. Often, an immune response
within the BIS is based on a feedback mechanism between the innate and adaptive immune systems.
Such a feedback can result in a feedback loop, in which the innate immune systems further stimu-
lates the adaptive immune system, and vice versa [21]. For example, a pathogen gets eliminated, if
it was recognized by the adaptive immune system as a pathogen, and at the same time, the innate
immune system signals that this pathogen causes some damage to the human organism. Under this
specific immune reaction, only damage inflicting or infectious cells get eliminated by the BIS.
This demonstrates that a two-way communication, hereafter referred to as co-stimulation, be-
tween the innate and adaptive immune systems is common. Immunologists such as Frauwirth and
Thompson describe co-stimulation as the involvement of ”reciprocal and sequential signals be-
tween cells” in order to fully activate a lymphocyte [21]. The role of lymphocytes is to recognize
a specific pathogen, to trigger a corresponding immune reaction and in some forms they are also
capable of pathogen elimination.
Priming in the BIS describes the effects of a first encounter of an immune cell with a pathogen.
More specifically, immunologists define priming as the activation and clonal expansion of certain
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immune cells into effector cells that are then capable of inducing a full immune response against a
specific pathogen.
Communication capabilities within the BIS received an increased interest from the Artificial
immune systems (AIS) community and evolved into an independent research direction. Several
different types of danger, safe and amplifying signals were proposed within the Danger theory due
to Aickelin et al. [1].
2.2 Selection Principles
T-cells and B-cells are lymphocytes providing pattern matching capabilities necessary for pathogen
detection. Before being released into the body they are subject to a selection process. The goal of
this selection process is to produce T-cells and B-cells with a high degree of diversity [35].
T-cells mature in the thymus in two stages called (i) positive selection and (ii) negative selection.
(i) Immature T-cells in the thymus get first tested on self cell reactivity. T-cells that do not react
with self cells at all are subject to removal.
(ii) T-cells that survived the first step are tested on whether they can react with self cells too
strongly. If this is true, the result is again removal.
Remaining T-cells are released into the body. Such T-cells are mature but remain naive until
their activation. In order these two stages to be achievable, the thymus is protected by a blood-
thymic barrier that is able to keep this organ pathogen-free. As a result, mature T-cells are reactive
with cells that could not be present in the thymus, i.e. with non-self cells. They are also weakly
self reactive but they are unable to get activated by a self cell. Unfortunately, the repertoire of self
cells in the thymus does not have to be complete. Additionally, not all self cells are expressed in the
thymus at adequate levels to allow for negative selection. This can lead to reactivity with self cells,
i.e. to autoimmune reactions (false positives). In order to suppress autoimmune reactions, the BIS
applies several mechanisms that allow for peripheral immunoregulation [40].
Creating of new B-cells with an improved pathogen recognition ability is done through cloning.
Cloning of B-cells allows for some “error”. This error is believed to be inversely proportional to the
matching ability of a given B-cell. The weaker is the ability, the greater is the error allowance. The
process of B-cell cloning with an error allowance is called somatic hypermutation. The purpose of
somatic hypermutation is to diversify the matching ability of B-cells.
Both T-cells and B-cells that were not able to recognize any pathogen get removed. This happens
to most B-cells and T-cells and can be understood as an instance of positive selection (only the fittest
stay). Unlike B-cells, T-cells can only recognize pathogen fragments expressed by another type of
cells called Antigen presenting cells (APC). Both T-cells and B-cells can mature into memory B-
cells and T-cells. In contrast to normal T-cells and B-cells, memory cells live much longer, thus
allowing the host to keep its immunological memory over a long period.
2.3 Discussion
Our goal is to benefit from the different capabilities of the innate and adaptive immune system. We
build on the large body of evidence that indicates that innate and adaptive immune systems tightly
cooperate when detecting a pathogen; see e.g. [28, 38]. Liu and Janeway [34] state that pathogen
recognition mechanisms that combine T-cell receptor binding and APC based co-stimulation are the
most efficient inducers of clonal activity of certain T-cells; see Fig. 1. Medzhitov and Janeway fur-
ther comment [38]: “This whole mechanism ensures that a T-cell will normally receive both signals
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Figure 1: Pathogen recognition: co-stimulation and pathogen presentation are present during lym-
phocyte activation as well as any subsequent pathogen recognition.
necessary for activation only if the peptide recognized by the T-cell receptor is derived from the
pathogen that initially induced the co-stimulation activity”. This statement provides an interesting
clue on the design of misbehavior detection systems. It suggests that when decreased detection
performance is exchanged for increased adaptivity, it is necessary to ensure that any behavior, being
currently classified by the adaptive detection system, is identical with the behavior used to train this
adaptive system. Regarding misbehavior detection systems, such a strategy could be capable of de-
creasing the probability that a behavior, having an anomalous or random character, gets incorrectly
classified as a known misbehavior type. For this reason, when designing our misbehavior detection
system, an efficient implementation of this strategy was one of our key ambitions.
The adaptive immune system benefits from its capability to produce immune cells with clonally
distributed receptors. This random approach has two basic drawbacks: i) it cannot avoid creating
immune cells that recognize self cells and ii) it cannot avoid creating immune cells that do not
recognize any other cell: self or non-self. Therefore this process is combined with negative and/or
positive selection in order to remove such immune cells. When deciding whether a cell is self or non-
self, the BIS takes advantage of the capability of the innate immune system to recognize pathogen-
associated molecular patterns (PAMPs) [38]. PAMPs are invariant molecular structures associated
with each pathogen. This feature of the innate immune system has developed over evolutionary
time. A successful pathogen could try to avoid being recognized either by changing its PAMP or
simply by avoiding such evolutionarily selected receptors. Changing PAMP, even though feasible,
requires a genetic recombination of the pathogen. Such a recombination could result in a cell that
partially or completely lost its pathogenicity. It is indeed the case that some pathogens managed to
avoid being detected by the slowly evolving receptors of the innate immune system. The Nature’s
answer to this problem seems to be a specialized class of APCs called dendritic cells [4]. Dendritic
cells are especially helpful in recognizing the danger connected with pathogens with high mutation
rates, e.g. viruses.
When translating the mechanisms of the BIS into a computational approach we decided to focus
on the information flow among the various agents of the innate and adaptive immune system. We
abstracted away from the particularities of the various selection and learning mechanisms discussed
above. We assumed that they can be substituted by general purpose machine learning algorithms
such as decision trees, support vector machines etc. We were inspired by the co-stimulation process
that is required to activate a lymphocyte. We understood co-stimulation as an interplay between
the adaptive and innate immune system when detecting a pathogen. When interpreting priming, we
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assumed that the innate immune system can provide strong clues on the pathogenicity of a non-self
cell.
Our decision to apply standard machine learning algorithms, instead of their immune inspired
counterparts, allowed us to concentrate on the control flow of our co-stimulation and priming ap-
proaches. The key question that we aimed at answering was whether co-stimulation and priming
can be translated into computational approaches that inherit some of the key characteristics of the
BIS: detection efficiency and ability to suppress false positives (autoimmune reactions).
3 The State-of-the-art
In this section we review the few prior approaches that took advantages of co-stimulation. Addition-
ally, we review several other approaches that deal with detecting mainstream types of misbehavior
such as data packet dropping or wormholes.
3.1 Co-stimulation Approaches
In one of the first BIS inspired works, Hofmeyr and Forrest [24] described an AIS able to detect
anomalies in a wired TCP/IP network. Anomaly detection was based on the negative selection
algorithm [20]. After this mechanism detected an anomaly, a message was sent to a human operator.
He was given 24 hours to confirm a detected attack. This means, two qualitatively different sorts
of classification were used: negative selection and human expertise. The second approach is only
applied, if a co-stimulation in the form of a message is received.
Sarafijanovic´ and Le Boudec [41, 33] introduced an AIS for misbehavior detection in mobile
ad hoc wireless networks. A local mechanism applied by each node in the network required a
co-stimulation in order to classify a neighbor as misbehaving. The origin of co-stimulation was a
TCP connection source that perceived data losses. The information about a perceived data loss was
forwarded along the connection. The authors observed that their form of co-stimulation reduces the
false positives rate. The disadvantage of their approach is its tight coupling with a transport layer
protocol (TCP), thus negatively influencing energy consumption.
3.2 Other Misbehavior Detection Approaches
Even though our focus stays on co-stimulation and its suitability for misbehavior detection, we
would also like to offer insight into related approaches not taking advantage of this technique.
Marti et al. in [37] introduced two techniques for data dropping detection in ad hoc networks:
watchdog and pathrater. A watchdog allows for collecting traffic information about neighboring
nodes using promiscuous radio mode. Based on this information, a pathrater can assess route re-
liability, thus maximizing the chance that data packets get correctly delivered. Due to the energy
consumption connected with operation in promiscuous node, the watchdog technique is not suitable
for energy constrained ad hoc networks, even though, it offers high data packet dropping detection
rates [17].
Hu et al. [25, 26] introduced two approaches using packet leashes for wormhole detection in
mobile wireless networks. A wormhole is an out-of-band connection between two devices which
allows an attacker to manipulate the network topology and thus the routing of packets. A leash either
consists of an authenticated timing or location based information. A metric calculating whether a
packet has traveled further than allowed (or physically possible) is applied to the leashes. While
the first approach requires a tightly time synchronized network, the other one requires GPS (Global
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Positioning System) based geographical information. The disadvantage of the former approach is
the increased message and authentication complexity, the disadvantage of the latter approach is the
increased energy consumption connected with GPS device operation.
Huang and Lee [27] introduced a cooperative approach for intrusion detection in ad hoc net-
works. It takes advantage of a comprehensive set of 141 data traffic features. The sampling rate for
the feature computation was 5 seconds. It applies a decision tree for the classification of traffic sam-
ples based on these features. It thus requires a learning period in which the classifier gets trained.
To improve the energy efficiency of their approach, a cooperative approach is considered. Under
this approach a clique of nodes elects a cluster head. This cluster head does network monitoring
on behalf of other clique members until a new cluster head is elected. The disadvantage of such an
approach is the necessity to overhear the data traffic in promiscuous mode and to reelect new cluster
heads so that the monitoring load gets evenly distributed among the clique members.
Bhuse et al. [8] proposed an approach for data packet dropping detection that does not rely on
promiscuous mode. In their approach each connection destination node sends to the source con-
nection node a statistic about received data packets. This is done over an alternative route that is
computed by the routing protocol. The received statistic is then compared with a similar statistic
computed by the source node. Based on this, the source node can decide whether all nodes on the
connection cooperate in data packet forwarding. This approach does not allow to detect the individ-
ual misbehaving node. The energy consumption overhead of this approach when the DSR protocol
is used for alternative route discovery is 0.6-2.6% for paths of length 3 to 13 hops. The ability of
this approach to find an alternative route decreases as the number of data dropping nodes increases
as well as with the connection length. For example, when 10% nodes are dropping data packets the
reported success rate is about 75% and 25% for route lengths of 3 and 13 hops, respectively.
Gonzales et al. [23] proposed an approach for data dropping detection in ad hoc networks. Their
approach is based on the principle of flow conservation. Under this approach, it is assumed that the
number of data packets, that a node receives, equals the number of data packets that it forwards
excluding the cases when the given node is also the destination node. The success of their approach
relies on data traffic overhearing in promiscuous mode. The focus of their experimental evaluation
was to determine the ratio of data packets that a node is allowed to drop without being detected.
This ratio is measured relative to the maximum number of data packets that a node is allowed (or
expected) to drop. Their experimental evaluation shows that this ratio is about 10-15%.
Krishnamurthy et al. [32] introduced a machine learning misbehavior detection approach for
wireless sensor networks. They considered several misbehavior types: continuous signal jamming,
signal jamming applied only if there is other radio transmission detected, data packet redirecting and
data packet dropping. The latter misbehavior type required data traffic observation in promiscuous
mode. Classification was done using a linear discriminant analysis and/or a fixed-width clustering
with different distance measures. They tested their approach on a sensor network based on Crossbow
MicaZ motes and TinyOS. The memory footprint of their approach was 31,342 bytes and 3,500
bytes of flash memory and data memory, respectively. The reported detection accuracy for data
packet dropping was nearly 100% with linear discriminant analysis applied.
3.3 Further Comments
Hofmeyr and Forrest [24] described the first immune inspired architecture for intrusion detection
in wired networks. Their work has a strong methodological character. Their interpretation of co-
stimulation relies on a human operator to decide whether a detected anomaly is the consequence of
an intrusion.
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The approach of Sarafijanovic´ and Le Boudec [41, 33] avoids the necessity to invoke a human
response after a possible misbehavior in mobile ad hoc network was detected. As mentioned above,
this was done by coupling negative selection with a transport layer protocol. The main methodolog-
ical drawback of their approach is that they combined two immune inspired mechanisms, negative
selection and co-stimulation, without having first understood the efficiency of each approach in iso-
lation. As a consequence, the performance of their approach did not afford for a clear interpretation.
The related insights on the efficiency of negative selection were published only recently by Elberfeld
and Textor [18].
Even though, co-stimulation was cited as a possible approach for gaining control over false
positives in intrusion/misbehavior detection [24, 41, 33], this mechanism received only very limited
attention. For this reason, the process of translating co-stimulation into a computational approach
required from our side a substantial amount of conceptual effort.
With respect to the above reviewed work, we followed two objectives. We aimed at benefiting
from the capability of co-stimulation to suppress false positives. At the same time, due to energy
efficiency concerns, we also aimed at minimizing any overhearing in promiscuous mode. When
evaluating the energy efficiency of our approach, we compare against watchdog based misbehavior
detection. Watchdog based misbehavior detection offers solid detection performance in scenarios
where the ambition is to identify a specific node executing data dropping, data delaying or a similar
misbehavior type [17]. Such a solid detection performance makes it straightforward to understand
the trade-off between detection performance and energy efficiency, i.e. to understand whether any
decrease in detection performance was matched by an increase in energy efficiency.
The main discerning factor between our approach and the approaches reviewed above is that
our approach develops a conceptual framework for misbehavior detection in ad hoc wireless net-
works. The reviewed approaches concentrate on achieving an acceptable misbehavior detection
performance, whereas we attempt to provide a means that offers the possibility to influence the
detection rate, the false positives rate and the energy efficiency in a controlled manner.
4 Co-stimulation and Priming: A Computational Interpretation
Before discussing the different approaches which take advantage of co-stimulation and priming,
we define and discuss co-stimulation and priming in a more general way, so that a computational
interpretation with focus on network security is straightforward [11, 12, 15].
Definition Co-stimulation is an auxiliary signal indicating that a misbehavior causes damage to the
system.
Definition Priming is a process for specifying the alertness levels of a system with respect to a
misbehavior class.
Notice that co-stimulation, with respect to the above definition, implies that at least two de-
tection mechanisms are applied when detecting misbehavior. Clearly, co-stimulation can be im-
plemented in several ways. Our approach aims not only at improving the misbehavior detection
precision by using two distinct detection mechanisms, but also by requiring that these two detection
mechanisms have very different energy efficiency. In our case, the less energy efficient type of clas-
sification is only used upon receiving a co-stimulatory signal from a more energy efficient type of
classification.
The co-stimulation based misbehavior classification approach, that we next discuss, resembles
the “cascading classifiers” of Kaynak and Alpaydin introduced in [30]. Their approach is based on
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Figure 2: Misbehavior detection architecture.
a sequential application of several classifiers such that ”at the next stage, using a costlier classifier,
we build a more complex rule to cover those uncovered patterns of the previous stage”. Our BIS
inspired approach can be seen as an instance of cascading classification. It is however not the
complexity of classification rules that is increased at each step but the energy cost connected with
observing additional states and events necessary for a more precise reasoning about misbehavior.
Cascading classifiers were empirically studied by Gama and Brazdil in [22]. They combined
several types of classifiers: Bayes classifier, C4.5 and linear discriminant function. Their focal point
was to investigate whether cascading classification could offer some classification performance im-
provement over classification using a single classifier. They tested this approach on several standard
datasets from the UCI Repository [3]. Their results showed that cascading classifiers offer some
improvement in classification precision, however, this improvement was not significant enough to
initiate additional follow-up research. Their results also did not point out that cascading classifiers
could offer some advantage in distributed environments such as ad hoc networks.
When translating priming into a computational approach, we decided to couple several basic
quality of service indicators, such as the number of data packets dropped or delayed, with a mech-
anism allowing for an efficient detection of their critical levels. Such critical levels can be set by
the human operator with the intent to monitor the network. Reaching or even surpassing such crit-
ical levels can be interpreted as being undesired, i.e. as misbehavior. Since continuous monitoring
of a node by its neighbors can be considered energy inefficient, we decided to take advantage of
co-stimulation, most notably of its ability to suppress false positives. This property allowed us to
design a simple energy efficient detection mechanism that relies on co-stimulation for false positives
control.
When interpreting co-stimulation and priming, our central goal was to mimic the capability of
two-way communication within the BIS. When implementing such a two-way communication, the
strategy discussed in Section 2.3 provided helpful clues. Since our computational interpretation is
8
f
si
1
≡ f
si+2
1
f
si
0
ss //❴❴❴❴❴❴ si //
``
//
hh
si+1 // si+2
f
si+2
1
xx //❴❴❴❴❴❴ sd
Figure 3: Data traffic measurement model.
based on two distinct detection mechanisms, we tended towards mapping one detection mechanism
to the adaptive immune system and the other one to the innate immune system. We considered the
detection mechanism that relies on continuous monitoring in promiscuous mode to be more similar
to the innate immune system. The other detection mechanism was, due to its greater flexibility
conveyed by the underlying machine learning algorithms, assigned to represent the adaptive immune
system. In retrospection, we still consider such a mapping useful, since it helped to develop a
conceptual picture of our misbehavior detection architecture.
Co-stimulation and priming are key mechanisms of our misbehavior detection architecture
shown in Fig. 2. The purpose of the misbehavior detection module is to provide an initial sepa-
ration of data traffic samples stemming from either normal behavior or misbehavior. This module
can consist of several detection algorithm, for example, supervised or unsupervised machine learn-
ing algorithms. The false positives control module is only applied, if a suspicious data traffic sample
was detected. A classification error feedback allows for a computation of optimized alertness levels,
these in turn allow for a more efficient separation of data traffic samples.
5 Energy Efficient Co-stimulation Approach
Our first goal was to introduce the capability of co-stimulation into our misbehavior detection ar-
chitecture [17]. Since the purpose of the misbehavior detection module and the false positives rate
control module is different, it was necessary to identify several feature sets, each offering a different
perspective on a node’s behavior.
Our co-stimulation approach is based on the local connection-oriented traffic measurement
model depicted in Fig. 3. Let si+1 be a misbehaving node and let si and si+2 be its neighbors.
These nodes are lying on a data connection from ss to sd. Let us further assume that each node
can measure local traffic using two distinct feature sets f0 and f1. Let us denote their numerical
instances as fˆ0 and fˆ1.
After the node si+2 computes fˆ1, this feature set instance is proliferated in the upstream con-
nection direction (towards connection source ss). The node si then compares its own fˆ1 sample
with the sample received from si+2. Based on this, a behavior classification with respect to the mis-
behaving node si+1 is done. If si classifies si+1 as misbehaving, it will additionally use the feature
set f0 for classification. If misbehavior is detected again, si+1 is finally classified as misbehaving.
To simplify the notation let us define: F1 = f
si
1 ∪ f
si+2
1 . Similarly, assuming that fˆ0 and fˆ1 are
represented as vectors, we define Fˆ1 = fˆ
si
1 ◦ fˆ
si+2
1 , where ◦ is the operator of vector concatenation.
With respect to this notation, our approach to co-stimulation can be succinctly expressed as:
F1
co−stimulation // f0 (1)
The next task in implementing co-stimulation was to populate the feature sets F1 and f0 with
suitable features. When choosing the features, we aimed at the following objectives: i) the relation-
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ship between the feature sets F1 and f0 should be well defined, ii) computation of F1 should be
energy more efficient than computation of f0 and iii) classification based on f0 should offer higher
precision than classification precision based on F1.
To simplify the search for suitable features, we decided that the feature set f0 would be dom-
inated by watchdog features, i.e. features computed in promiscuous mode. Since watchdog based
features benefit from explicit overhearing of each data packet, the classification precision that they
convey is very high. Since promiscuous mode prevents the wireless interface from entering idle
state, operation in promiscuous mode can be considered energy inefficient. According to [19],
power consumption in idle and receive states is about 12-20 higher than in sleep mode.
Including watchdog features, we identified 24 candidate features. These features were divided
into three groups with respect to their energy requirements and protocol assumptions. A wrapper
approach [31] was used to identify features with a statistically significant contribution to the de-
tection of the three considered misbehavior types. More specifically, each of the 24 features was
tested whether it significantly decreases the classification error with respect to these misbehavior
types. The feature that decreased the classification error the most was chosen for the final feature
set. The process was then repeated with the remaining features until there was no other feature that
could significantly decrease the classification error. This was coupled with cross-validation in order
to obtain a robust estimate of the classification error in each round.
The output from the above procedure were three feature sets, each with a different degree of
energy efficiency. Since the statistical significance of each feature within a feature set was known,
it allowed us to understand how these three feature sets are related. Given this knowledge, we
decided to concentrate only on the least and most energy efficient feature set that formed f0 and
f1, respectively. The wrapper based approach showed that in addition to watchdog features, the
f0 feature set must also include several topology related features in order to facilitate detection of
wormholes.
5.1 Definitions
We evaluate misbehavior classification performance in terms of detection rate and false positives
(FP) rate. We assume that a classifier K(f) computed by a learning algorithm is used in the classi-
fication process, where f ∈ {f0,F1} is the feature set used to reason about the behavior of a node.
The classifier K(f) is then used to classify the objects Ω = {o1, ..., op}, where p is the number of
these objects. The two measures are then computed as follows:
det. rateΩcj (K(f)) =
ccj
ncj
× 100.0% FP rateΩcj (K(f)) =
FPcj
FPcj + ccj
× 100.0% (2)
where cj is the j-th class. ncj is the number of objects labeled with the class cj ; note that
ncj > 0 in all our experiments. ccj is the number of objects that were correctly classified by the
learning algorithm as belonging to the class cj . FPcj is the number of objects incorrectly predicted
as belonging to cj .
The overall misclassification rate is evaluated by means of the classification error:
ǫΩ(K(f)) =
∑
cj
FPcj
∑
cj
ncj
× 100.0% (3)
Since the focus of our work is on the features being used in the classification process, rather than
on the type of learning algorithm, we simplify the notation by using det. rateΩcj (f), FP rate
Ω
cj
(f)
and ǫΩ(f) instead of FP rateΩcj (K(f)), FP rate
Ω
cj
(K(f)) and ǫΩ(K(f)), respectively. We also
omit the superscript Ω, whenever there is a single set of objects to be classified.
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5.2 Properties of the f0 and F1 Feature Sets
Our experimental results [17] show that with respect to the classification error ǫ and the energy cost
ξ, the properties of F1 and f0 can be summarized as follows:
1. For win. size→ 0, it holds:
lim
win. size→0
ǫ(F1) ≈ ǫ(f0) (4)
This characterizes the relationship between watchdog and F1 based misbehavior detection. It
points out that instead of observing each data packet’s delivery in promiscuous mode by the
node si, it can be equally well done in a cooperative way by si and si+2, if win. size→ 0.
2. For win. size≫ 0, it holds:
ǫ(F1) > ǫ(f0) (5)
ξ(F1) < ξ(f0) (6)
The measure of energy cost ξ includes feature computation costs as well as all induced com-
munication costs. The communication costs for f0 are related to overhearing in promiscuous
mode. The communication costs for F1 are related to the necessity to transmit fˆ
si+2
1 over two
hops to si.
The first inequality reflects the fact that overhearing each data packet in promiscuous mode
gives a better base for classification than a classification based on features computed by two
distinct nodes and aggregated over a time window. The other inequality reflects the fact that
operation in promiscuous mode is inherently energy inefficient.
The features in the sets f0 and F1 can be computed without much computational overhead. Our
misbehavior detection results could have been better if a more complex Fourier or wavelets analysis
of the packet stream had been done. As the results by Barford et al. point out [5], this could lead to
good anomaly detection rates.
5.3 Co-stimulation and its Misbehavior Detection Efficiency
Let Ω be the set of all vectors subject to misbehavior classification. The vectors in Ω represent
the behavior of monitored nodes (or in general, any other type of objects). In our case, a vector
vsim ∈ Ω has two components: v
si
m = Fˆ
si
1 ◦ fˆ
si
0 , where m identifies the time window in which Fˆ
si
1
was computed. Dependent upon the evaluation of Fˆsi1 , the computation of fˆ
si
0 is started in the time
period following the time window m. F1 and f0 based classification of v
si
m is done using the Fˆ
si
1
component and the fˆsi0 component, respectively.
Let ΩF1 ⊆ Ω be the subset of vectors that were marked as representing suspicious behavior,
after the F1 based classification was done. Let us first assume that ǫ
Ω(f0) = 0, where ǫ
Ω(f0) is the
classification error of f0 based classification applied to the vector set Ω. If f0 based classification is
applied to ΩF1 , it clearly holds:
ǫΩF1 (f0) = 0 (7)
This implies, for the final FP rate and a given misbehavior class cj , after co-stimulation is
applied, it holds:
FP rateΩcj (F1 → f0) = 0 (8)
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In other words, the conditional application of f0 based classification removes all misclassified
vectors. Furthermore, the final detection rate for the given class is determined by the detection rate
after the F1 based classification:
det. rateΩcj (F1 → f0) = det. rate
Ω
cj
(F1) (9)
Since to achieve ǫΩ(f0) = 0 may not be possible, Eqs. 8 and 9 translate for ǫ
Ω(f0) 6= 0 to:
FP rateΩcj (F1 → f0) = FP rate
Ω
cj
(f0) (10)
det. rateΩcj (F1 → f0) ≤ det. rate
Ω
cj
(F1) (11)
This means, the final FP rate is only depending on the efficiency of f0 based classification.
Eq. 10 is based on the assumption that when classifying Ω and ΩF1 using f0 based classification,
the following holds:
FP rate
ΩF1
cj (f0) = FP rate
Ω
cj
(f0) (12)
To what extent such an assumption is reasonable, was one of the goals of our experimental
analysis. Notice that co-stimulation, being a classification approach where f0 based classification is
applied conditionally, can result in two groups of vectors: i) vectors subject only to F1 based clas-
sification and ii) vectors subject to both F1 and f0 based classification. This asymmetric situation
provides the basis for energy efficient misbehavior detection.
When detecting misbehavior, f0 based detection will only get used, if (i) F1 based classification
detects a true positive or (ii) F1 based classification outputs a false positive. Since it is reasonable to
assume that any ad hoc network will work reliably, most of the time, our focus stays on the energy
cost analysis for misbehavior free ad hoc networks. With respect to the above said, the overall
energy cost of co-stimulation ξ in a misbehavior free ad hoc network can be modeled as:
ξ = ξ(F1) + g(FP rate
Ω
cj
(F1))× ξ(f0) (13)
where g(.) is the rate at which f0 based classification is mistakenly applied in a misbehavior
free ad hoc network. ξ(f0) is dominated by the cost of overhearing in promiscuous mode. The
options for decreasing this cost are limited and therefore it can be considered fixed. When applying
F1 based classification that allows for a trade-off between its classification precision and ξ(F1), and
it holds that ξ(f0)≫ ξ(F1), then the effects of such a trade-off are further amplified. Increasing the
precision of F1 based classification can thus lead to a substantial decrease of co-stimulation cost ξ,
and vice versa. Additionally, if we assume that Eq. 12 holds, then this trade-off translates for a given
misbehavior class cj into a trade-off between detection rate and energy efficiency, while keeping the
FP rate unchanged.
6 Towards Priming against Misbehavior
Co-stimulation, as presented in the previous sections, requires that two distinct F1 and f0 based
classifiers get computed. This implies that two sets of Fˆ1 and fˆ0 feature vectors, labeled with
the classes under consideration, must be available for training. Next, we discuss how this can be
avoided.
In this section, we delve into the mechanisms of error propagation [11, 12]. Error propagation
is the opposite of co-stimulation, i.e. in a short form it can be expressed as:
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F1 f0
error propagationoo (14)
Eq. 4 states that forwin. size→ 0, theF1 and f0 based classification approaches offer the same
classification accuracy. This implies, if ǫΩ(f0) = 0, for the Fˆ1 and fˆ0 feature vectors stemming
from the same time window, the classification outcome will be (nearly) the same. This motivates
the following strategy: compute Fˆ1 and fˆ0 feature vectors, classify the fˆ0 feature vector according
to a predefined threshold, and then, label the Fˆ1 feature vector with the same label as the fˆ0 based
vector. This allows us to build a labeled Fˆ1 based feature vector set necessary for the computation
of an F1 based classifier.
The application of such thresholds is hereafter referred to as priming. The general goal of
priming is to introduce a well-defined level of consistency, when detecting misbehavior in an ad
hoc network. With respect to the above said, we define misbehavior as a violation of the priming
thresholds P = {p1, p2, ..., pl}, where l is the number of priming thresholds. A priming threshold
can be for example the maximum allowed data packet loss at a node or the maximum allowed data
packet processing delay at a node. If any priming threshold is violated, the corresponding Fˆ1 and
fˆ0 feature vectors will be labeled as representing misbehavior.
In order to achieve a good level of energy efficiency, it is desirable to apply win. size ≫ 0.
Since however a larger time window size introduces a loss in misbehavior detection precision, error
propagation must be followed by co-stimulation:
ǫ
F1
co−stimulation //
f0
error propagation
oo
22❡❡❡❡❡❡❡
P
kk❳❳❳❳❳❳
(15)
Co-stimulation is achieved by computing a fresh fˆ0 feature vector and comparing it with P .
This approach is also schematically depicted in Fig. 5(a).
Error propagation and co-stimulation is executed within the same node; see Fig. 4. Notice that
some nodes in the example network, for the shown data flows, are unable to compute Fˆ1 since they
do not have any two-hop neighbor si+2. On the other hand, several nodes receive multiple fˆ
si+2
1 ,
e.g. s1 from s3 and s5.
Let us now formulate the effects of these two phases in more detail. Let us assume that
win. size≫ 0. For simplicity, let us also assume that ǫΩ(f0) = 0.
1. After the error propagation phase: it holds that ǫΩ(F1) > 0, i.e. the precision of F1 based
classification is for win. size≫ 0 lower than the precision of f0 based classification. This is
a direct consequence of the property expressed in Eq. 5. ǫΩ(F1) > 0 implies that there exists
a class cj for which at least one of the following holds:
det. rateΩcj (F1) = a < 100%
FP rateΩcj (F1) = b > 0%
2. After the co-stimulation phase: co-stimulation applied after error propagation decreases the
FP rate of the class cj to zero, while keeping the detection rate unchanged:
det. rateΩcj (F1 → f0) = a
FP rateΩcj (F1 → f0) = 0%
This is a direct consequence of the properties expressed in Eqs. 8 and 9.
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Figure 4: A 10-node ad hoc network with priming. s1 is the only data flow source node. s3, s7 and
s10 are sink nodes for three distinct data flows.
Since to achieve ǫΩ(f0) = 0 may not be feasible, Eqs. 10 and 11 apply. This means that the
final FP rate for a class cj is determined by FP rate
ΩF1
cj (f0). Similarly, the final detection rate has
an upper bound equal to det. rateΩcj (F1). Notice that win. size also influences the time delay for
detecting a misbehavior, i.e. it should reflect the requirements prescribed for the given misbehavior
detection system.
6.1 Error Propagation Algorithm with Optimization
The error propagation algorithm can be extended with an optimization phase; see Fig. 5(b). With
respect to the classification outcome, the individual priming threshold values for each node can be
optimized, i.e. the classification error can be minimized. This can be done by a repeated application
of the error propagation and co-stimulation phases, while adjusting the priming thresholds for each
node, until a termination condition is met; see Fig. 5. This approach can be described as priming
with influences of e.g. noise being considered locally. More formally, new optimized priming
thresholds P∗ = {p∗1, p
∗
2, ..., p
∗
l } for each node si will be found, so that the final classification
error for each node si is minimized. The repeated application of the error propagation and co-
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(b) An approach extended with optimization.
Figure 5: Error propagation algorithm.
stimulation phases is inspired by the feedback loop between the innate and adaptive immune systems
as discussed in Section 2.
Our extended approach bears a certain similarity to the backpropagation algorithm for artificial
neural networks [2]. The backpropagation algorithm takes advantage of two steps, feed-forward
and error backpropagation. These two steps are repeated in order to minimize an error function.
A notable difference between our extended approach and the backpropagation algorithm is, co-
stimulation phase is designed to revert the FP rate to the levels before any error propagation was
done. Since the FP rate is expected to stay unchanged, the search for suitable values for priming
thresholds is less complex.
7 Co-stimulation and Priming: Experimental Results
A performance evaluation of co-stimulation and priming was done using the JiST/SWANS network
simulator [6]. JiST/SWANS was chosen over other alternative such as ns2 due to its better scala-
bility with the experiment size, both in terms of event processing speed and memory overhead [6].
JiST/SWANS is about two orders of magnitude faster than ns2 with Tcl.
JiST/SWANS does not offer any ready-to-use misbehavior implementation. We took advantage
of AIS-Lib, a library for performance evaluation of AIS based detection systems for ad hoc wireless
networks, introduced by Drozda et al. in [16]. AIS-Lib implements several types of misbehavior.
The experiments were based on a network with 1718 nodes. The number of connections were
50. The length of a connection was 7 hops. Each connection expired after 15-20 minutes and
was substituted with a new connection with randomly chosen source and destination nodes. Three
different types of misbehavior were considered: data packet dropping, data packet delaying and
wormholes. Wormholes are private (out-of-band) links between one or several pairs of nodes. They
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are added by an attacker in order to attract data traffic into them to gain control over packet routing
and other network operations.
The classification based on F1 or f0 was done using a decision tree classifier. The reason for
using a decision tree classifier are the results that we report in [7]. Therein we compared several
learning algorithms such as decision tree classifier, naive Bayes classifier, support vector machines,
neural networks and negative selection with respect to their applicability in misbehavior detection
scenarios. We concluded that for the considered scenarios, the classification results based on de-
cision tree classifier dominate the classification results obtained by the other learning algorithms.
Additionally, since decision tree classifier is less complex than the other considered classification
approaches, it is more suitable for ad hoc networks with limited (battery) resources.
When estimating the energy efficiency of the co-stimulation and priming approaches, we con-
sidered several wireless devices: TI CC2420, Wistron CM9 miniPCI card, Ubiquiti XR2 card and
Lucent 2Mbps IEEE802.11 wireless card. For the reasons stated in Sect. 3, we compared the en-
ergy consumption of our approaches with the energy consumption of misbehavior detection done in
promiscuous mode. The parameters used in our simulations are summarized in Figure 6.
The results for co-stimulation reported in [17] show, for a scenario with win. size = 500s and
with respect to the general misbehavior class mis (in bimodal normal-misbehavior classification),
the following:
FP rateΩmis(F1 → f0) = 1.67± 2.59%
∼= FP rateΩmis(f0) = 1.77± 0.66% (16)
det. rateΩmis(F1 → f0) = 78.89± 1.71%
∼= det. rateΩmis(F1) = 76.40± 2.53% (17)
The achieved FP rateΩmis(F1) was 15.09 ± 2.27%. Comparing the results for the F1 and
F1 → f0 based classification, it is clear that F1 → f0 offers a detection rate comparable to F1,
however, a much lower false positives rate.
An example of the detection performance and the energy efficiency is shown in Table 1, where
win. size is the time window size applied by F1 based classification, FP rate is the false posi-
tives rate achieved after F1 based classification is done, ξ is the total energy consumption of co-
stimulation, γ is the reduction in energy consumption achieved by co-stimulation compared to over-
hearing in promiscuous mode, det. rate is the detection of co-stimulation for a given misbehavior
class and FP rate is false postives rate achieved by co-stimulation for the same misbehavior class. It
can be seen that co-stimulation establishes a trade-off between detection rate and energy efficiency,
while keeping the false positives rate almost unchanged.
The results achieved applying priming are in many respects similar to those obtained by co-
stimulation. Again, a very good reduction in energy consumption could be achieved. The peak value
was 97.31%. Additionally to several misbehavior detection scenarios, we also evaluated the case
when priming is used to check whether network operational conditions are within limits prescribed
by the priming thresholds. We could achieve the final false positives rate equal to 0%.
8 Summary of Results and Research Challenges
Even though, a large amount of our research effort went into establishing co-stimulation and priming
as computational approaches, we also delved into other research areas. Most notably, we investi-
gated the suitability of negative selection for misbehavior detection. In order to facilitate the com-
plex simulation based experiments executed when evaluating co-stimulation and priming in realistic
settings, we designed AIS-Lib, a library for performance evaluation of AIS based misbehavior ap-
proaches. Additionally, we investigated the suitability of a locality sensitive hashing scheme for
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1. Classification algorithm: F1 based and f0 based classification was implemented as decision
tree. To decide whether a node within the decision tree should be further split (impurity measure),
we used the information gain measure [2]. We used the decision tree implementation from the
Rapidminer tool [39]. k-fold cross-validation with k = 20 was used to estimate classification
performance.
2. Network topology: Snapshot of movement modeled by random waypoint mobility model i.e. it
is a static network. There were 1,718 nodes. The area was a square of 2,900m×2,950m. The
transmission range of transceivers was 100 meters.
3. Misbehavior: data packet dropping, data packet delaying and wormholes. In data packet drop-
ping and data packet delaying scenarios, there were 20-30 nodes concurrently exercising misbe-
havior.
• Co-stimulation experiments: 30% data packets dropped, 30% data packets delayed 100ms,
20 wormholes. Data packet dropped or delayed were chosen uniformly at random.
• Priming experiments: 30% or 10% data packets dropped, 30% data packets delayed 100ms
or 20ms, 20 wormholes. Data packet dropped or delayed were chosen uniformly at random.
4. Time window size: 50, 100, 250 and 500 seconds.
5. Connections: 50 CBR (constant bit rate) connections. Each connection expires after 15-20 min-
utes and is then substituted with a new source-destination pair. The connection length is 7 hops.
6. Injection rate: 0.5 packet/second. Packet size: 68 bytes. MAC protocol: IEEE 802.11 DCF.
Routing protocol: AODV. Other parameters: Channel frequency: 2.4 GHz. Network proto-
col: IPv4. Connection type: UDP. Data rate: co-stimulation: 2Mbit/s; priming: 54Mbit/s and
250kbit/s.
7. The number of independent simulation runs for normal traffic and each misbehavior type: 20. The
simulation time was 4 hours.
8. Simulator used: JiST/SWANS; hardware used: 20× Linux (SuSE 10.0) PC with 2GB RAM and
Pentium 4 3GHz microprocessor.
9. Wireless devices considered when evaluating energy efficiency:
• co-stimulation: Lucent 2Mbps IEEE802.11 card.
• priming: TI CC2420, Wistron CM9, Ubiquiti XR2.
Figure 6: Parameters used in the experiments.
win. size FP rate [%] ξ γ Det.rate [%] FP rate [%]
[s] K(F1) [mJ] [%] K(F1)→ K(f0) K(F1)→ K(f0)
50 3.55 23.29 82.73 93.42 0.98
100 4.65 12.39 90.81 90.00 1.26
250 9.28 6.20 95.40 84.70 1.28
500 15.09 3.89 97.12 78.89 1.67
Table 1: Co-stimulation: energy consumption and misbehavior detection performance.
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intrusion detection. Next, we summarize the results related to these efforts. However before doing
so, we provide a short summary of results for the co-stimulation and priming approaches. We also
discuss several challenges [11, 12] related to these approaches:
1. Understanding watchdog based misbehavior detection: Since watchdog based misbehavior
detection (f0) is energy inefficient, it was mandatory to design a different type of misbehavior
detection (F1). The latter misbehavior detection approach is based on traffic measurements
by neighboring nodes. Our experimental results show that the properties of f0 and F1 based
classification can be expressed as in Eqs. 4, 5 and 6. This means, not only is computation of
F1 feature set more energy efficient, but for win. size→ 0, it can substitute watchdog based
misbehavior detection. Additionally, the detection precision of F1 based misbehavior detec-
tion decreases as win. size increases. This is a key property since it allows us to substitute
watchdog based misbehavior detection with its F1 based counterpart.
2. Co-stimulation vs priming: Co-stimulation requires that two distinct classifiers get computed.
This necessitates that two sets of labeled feature vectors are available. Priming does not re-
quire any set of labeled feature vectors as input. Instead it relies on a set of priming thresholds
that define the limits for network operational conditions. The focus of priming is different
from the focus of co-stimulation. The goal of co-stimulation is to provide a means for energy
efficient misbehavior detection, whereas the goal of priming is to provide a means for energy
efficient detection of priming threshold violation. A violation of priming thresholds can either
be interpreted as misbehavior or simply as an event which requires logging and analysis.
3. Single detection system instance per node: We only apply a single instance of the detec-
tion mechanism per node. This is different from the approach used by Sarafijanovic´ and
Le Boudec [41], where one instance was used to reason about the behavior of each neighbor.
Under our approach, F1 based classification detects that one of the neighbors is misbehaving.
The identity of the misbehaving node is later determined by f0, i.e. by watchdog features that
observe whether data packets get correctly forwarded by a specific node.
4. Independence of detection rate and FP rate: Co-stimulation allows that the final detection
rate and false positives rate are influenced by two distinct mechanisms: F1 and f0 based
classification. This fact is documented in Eqs. 10 and 11. This property allows for tuning the
detection system with respect to these two measures in isolation. We showed that in scenarios,
where the only goal is to detect whether a specific performance threshold was violated, it is
feasible to achieve ǫΩ(f0) = 0. For this reason, with respect to Eq. 8, it was possible to
decrease the final false positives rate to zero.
5. Energy efficiency: The costly f0 (watchdog) based classification is only applied if the energy
more efficientF1 classification detects a misbehavior. Under our experimental setup, the peak
energy consumption reduction was 92.7% compared to the energy cost of exclusive f0 based
classification. Co-stimulation allows us to choose a trade-off between detection performance
and energy efficiency. A higher level of energy efficiency can be achieved by increasing the
time window size. This results in a lower detection rate. Increasing energy efficiency has
however only a limited influence on the FP rate.
6. Source of co-stimulation: The co-stimulation approach due to Sarafijanovic´ and
Le Boudec [41] benefits from the information about data packet delivery provided by TCP
(Transmission Control Protocol). If a data packet is not delivered, then the connection source
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does not receive the corresponding packet acknowledgment. This can be then used as a co-
stimulation for another form of data packet loss detection. The transport layer can thus serve
as a potent source of co-stimulation for any lower layer detection mechanisms. This is how-
ever not always possible, since e.g. sensor networks are expected to operate with a reduced
set of transport layer services. The reason for such a reduction is also the energy consump-
tion related to transport layer services. The goal to increase energy efficiency of misbehavior
detection was our motivation for investigating a distinctly different form of co-stimulation.
7. Co-stimulation avoiding watchdog (f0) features: Watchdog features can only be computed, if
omnidirectional antennas are being used. Using a directional antenna by si+1 could preclude
any packet overhearing by si. A similar effect can be observed, if si+1 is capable of dynamic
radio radius adjustment. As Eq. 4 suggests, watchdog features can be substituted by F1 based
features, if win. size → 0. This implies, a co-stimulation based on F1 with a small window
size could be a viable substitute for an f0 based co-stimulation. For example, an F1 based
classification with a 25-second time window could be used instead:
F1(500s)
co−stimulation // F1(25s) (18)
This sort of co-stimulation would require an adaptive approach for requesting an fˆ
si+2
1 sample
based on a smaller time window size. It also limits the option of negative co-stimulation [12].
Negative co-stimulation is executed by si, if si+1 decides not to cooperate in forwarding
fˆ
si+2
1 . Under such circumstances, si will switch, after a time-out, to the f0 feature set com-
putation. Unlike F1 feature set computation, f0 feature set computation can be applied by si
at any time, unimpeded by the willingness of its neighbors to cooperate.
We next discuss a few challenges related to co-stimulation or priming:
1. Convergence of the extended procedure with optimization: In Section 6.1 we discussed prim-
ing extended with an optimization phase. This optimization phase allows for finding the
optimal thresholds for P∗. It is currently unclear, which optimization approach would suit
best this purpose, i.e. delivering the best performance with respect to the optimization con-
vergence.
2. Minimizing the rate of undecided vectors: Undecided vectors are the vectors that were after
F1 based classification marked as representing a misbehavior, but this could not be con-
firmed by f0 based classification. An especially severe case happens, if F1 based classifica-
tion correctly classifies a vector as representing a misbehavior, but this classification result
will get incorrectly rejected by f0 based classification. One of the possibilities how the de-
crease the rate of undecided vectors is to present f0 based classification with vectors that
this classification approach can correctly classify with a high success rate. This implies that
ǫΩF1 (f0)≪ ǫ
Ω(f0), i.e. the task to classify the vectors in ΩF1 is much less complex than the
task to classify the vectors in Ω. The challenge is to tune F1 based classification in such a
way that it outputs a vector set ΩF1 such that ǫ
ΩF1 (f0)→ 0.
At last, we discuss several results related to performance evaluation of misbehavior detection.
We also outline our preliminary on applying locality preserving hashing in intrusion detection.
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1. AIS-Lib: AIS-Lib, a library for performance evaluation of AIS based detection systems for ad
hoc wireless networks, was introduced by Drozda et al. in [16]. This library is based on the
Jist/SWANS network simulator [6]. It implements several misbehavior models such as data
packet dropping, data packet delaying or wormholes [26]. The implementation of this library
was an important step towards the feasibility of the simulation based performance evaluation
presented in [17, 12].
2. Applicability of negative selection for misbehavior detection: We investigated the suitability
of negative selection for misbehavior detection in ad hoc networks. We applied the computa-
tional approach to negative selection due to D’haeseleer et al. [10]. This approach considers
bit-vector representation of features. It randomly produces a set of detectors that are used to
detect anomalous behavior. Our results show that, under our experimental setup, less than 5%
detectors were used in detecting misbehavior [13, 14].
Additionally, we pointed out that simpler data traffic models such as the Constant bit rate
(CBR) model may pose a challenge to misbehavior detection systems due to their synchro-
nized nature, i.e. if data packets collide there is a high chance that data packet at a given node
will again collide. This introduces a certain amount of noise into the system, and therefore
constitutes a practical option in detection performance evaluation [42].
The work presented in [13, 14, 42] was our starting point in the area of misbehavior detection
research. Therein we formulated several key objectives related to the design of misbehavior
detection systems, most notably, energy efficiency and ability to rely on a single instance of
a learning algorithm. We also argued that it is necessary to expand our knowledge about
features suitable for misbehavior detection. An evaluation of existing misbehavior detection
approaches with respect to these objected led to the design of our co-stimulation and priming
inspired misbehavior detection architectures.
In [7] we compared negative selection with several standard machine learning algorithms
such as decision tree classifier, naive Bayes classifier, support vector machines and neural
networks. The performance evaluation was done using the same data sets as [13, 14]. Our
results show that these machine learning algorithm offer a better misbehavior detection per-
formance. With respect to this conclusion, we decided to focus on decision tree classifier
when classifying the data obtained in [17, 12].
3. Intrusion Detection in High Dimensional Space: Our goal was to investigate the suitability of
a locality sensitive hashing technique due to Datar et al. [9] for intrusion detection. This hash-
ing technique allows for finding the approximate solution to the k-nearest neighbors problem,
it can thus be used as a basis for a k-nearest neighbors classifier. In [36] we evaluate suitabil-
ity of this technique to intrusion detection. We use several standard benchmark files, most
notably the KDD’99 data files. These files were used in a competition that took place during
the KDD’99 conference. Our results are comparable with those of the KDD’99 winner. The
advantage of our approach is its applicability for classification when the number of features is
high, i.e. when learning algorithms such as decision tree classifier, support vector machines
or neural networks cannot cope with the feature vector dimensionality.
9 Conclusions
In this document we summarize our research efforts related to computational interpretation of two
basic immune mechanisms: co-stimulation and priming. This interpretation was done in the scope
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of misbehavior detection for ad hoc wireless networks. When formulating co-stimulation and prim-
ing as a computational approach we abstracted away from the molecular nature of these mecha-
nisms. Instead we concentrated on their logic structure. Needless to say, despite applying such a
simplified view, the path to a useful computational interpretation was not straightforward. This fact
underscores the conceptual character of our research.
Our computational interpretation of co-stimulation allows any detection system to introduce
two desirable properties: energy efficiency and false positives control. Additionally, it introduces
the option to exchange energy efficiency for misbehavior detection rate, while keeping the false pos-
itives rate unchanged. Priming builds on the capability of co-stimulation to suppress false positives.
Co-stimulation allows priming to learn several priming thresholds without paying attention to the
efficiency of this leaning process. The increased false positives rate is decreased by a subsequent
application of co-stimulation.
Even though, we concentrated on the applicability of co-stimulation and priming to misbehav-
ior detection in ad hoc networks, we believe these methods are of general interest. An important
characteristics of application scenarios, that could take advantage of these two methods, is the high
cost connected with the relocation of information, services or resources, and at the same time, the
feasibility to improve their control or allocation through one or several cost related parameters (such
as time window size).
An example where co-stimulation and priming could be applicable is information broadcasting.
When broadcasting information to users, the demand for any type of information can only be esti-
mated [44]. Since the users cannot send feedback directly to the broadcast source (e.g. satellite),
the feedback is sent intermittently using other paths for delivery (often a mix of wireless and wired
delivery paths). The feedback frequency can increase the accuracy, it is however connected with a
certain cost. It thus gives sense to track the demand with some prediction accuracy exchanged for
cost efficiency.
A limiting factor in translating the functionality of the BIS to technical systems remains our
narrow knowledge of the BIS. Immunology is a research area with a large number of experimen-
tal results published every year. These results are however often very specific to the life form in
investigation. As an example, we cite a recent result on priming of plant immunity [29].
The success of the BIS in protecting its host often benefits from the efficiency of underlying
chemical reactions at molecular level. Such an efficiency has often no obvious computational par-
allel. For example, the negative selection process required 15 years until an efficient computational
counterpart could be presented [18].
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The results discussed in the previous sections were originally presented in the documents that we
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present our results related to misbehavior detection in ad hoc wireless networks.
Introduction to Immune Inspired Computing with Focus on Ad Hoc Wireless Net-
works
Martin Drozda, Sven Schaust, Helena Szczerbicka. Immuno-Inspired Knowledge Management
for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks. In Smart Information and Knowledge Management, Ngoc Thanh
Nguyen and Edward Szczerbicki (Eds.), Studies in Computational Intelligence, vol. 260, pp. 1-26,
21
Springer, 2010. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04584-4 1
Co-stimulation and Priming
Martin Drozda, Sven Schaust, Sebastian Schildt, Helena Szczerbicka. Priming: Making the Re-
action to Intrusion or Fault Predictable. Natural Computing, 32 pages, Springer, 2010. URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11047-010-9219-8. In press.
Martin Drozda, Sebastian Schildt, Sven Schaust, Helena Szczerbicka. An Immuno-Inspired Ap-
proach to Misbehavior Detection in Ad Hoc Wireless Networks. Computing Research Repository
(CoRR), 15 pages, 2010. URL http://arxiv.org/abs/1001.3113
Performance Evaluation of Immune Inspired Approaches
Martin Drozda, Sebastian Schildt, Sven Schaust, Sandra Einhellinger, Helena Szczerbicka. A
Tool for Prototyping AIS Based Protection Systems for Ad hoc and Sensor Networks. Cy-
bernetics and Systems, vol. 39, no. 7, pp. 719-742, Taylor&Francis, 2008. URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01969720802257964
Comparing Negative Selection with Machine Learning Algorithms
Matthias Becker, Martin Drozda, Sven Schaust, Sebastian Bohlmann, Helena Szczerbicka.
On Classification Approaches for Misbehavior Detection in Wireless Sensor Networks. Jour-
nal of Computers, vol. 4, no. 5, pp. 357-365, Academy Publisher, 2009. URL
http://www.academypublisher.com/jcp/vol04/no05/jcp0405357365.html
Performance of Negative Selection in Misbehavior Detection Scenarios
Martin Drozda, Sven Schaust, Helena Szczerbicka. AIS for Misbehavior Detection in
Wireless Sensor Networks: Performance and Design Principles. In Proc. of IEEE
Congress on Evolutionary Computation (CEC’07), pp. 3719-3726, Singapore, 2007. URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CEC.2007.4424955
Martin Drozda, Sven Schaust, Helena Szczerbicka. Is AIS Based Misbehavior Detec-
tion Suitable for Wireless Sensor Networks? In Proc. of IEEE Wireless Communica-
tions and Networking Conference (WCNC’07), pp. 3130-3135, Hong Kong, 2007. URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/WCNC.2007.578
Sven Schaust, Martin Drozda. Influence of Network Payload and Traffic Models on the Detection
Performance of AIS. In Proc. of 2008 International Symposium on Performance Evaluation of
Computer and Telecommunication Systems (SPECTS’08), pp. 44-51, IEEE Press, Edinburgh, UK,
2008.
Suitability of Locality Preserving Hashing for Intrusion Detection
Stanislav Marcek, Martin Drozda, Gabriel Juhas, Fedor Lehocki. Intrusion Detection in High Di-
mensional Space. In Proc. of Second International Symposium on Applied Sciences in Bio-Medical
and Communication Technologies (ISABEL’09), 6 pages, IEEE Press, Bratislava, Slovakia, 2009.
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ISABEL.2009.5373652
22
References
[1] Aickelin, U., Bentley, P., Cayzer, S., Kim, J., McLeod, J.: Danger theory: The link be-
tween ais and ids? In: Timmis, J., Bentley, P.J., Hart, E. (eds.) ICARIS ’03: Proceedings
of the International Conference on Artificial Immune Systems. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol. 2787, pp. 147–155. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, Edinburgh, UK (2003), URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45192-1 15
[2] Alpaydin, E.: Introduction To Machine Learning. MIT Press (2004)
[3] Asuncion, A., Newman, D.: UCI machine learning repository (2007), URL
http://www.ics.uci.edu/∼mlearn/MLRepository.html
[4] Banchereau, J., Briere, F., Caux, C., Davoust, J., Lebecque, S., Liu, Y., Pulendran, B., Palucka,
K.: Immunobiology of dendritic cells. Annual review of immunology 18(1), 767–811 (2000),
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.immunol.18.1.767
[5] Barford, P., Kline, J., Plonka, D., Ron, A.: A signal analysis of network traf-
fic anomalies. In: IMW ’02: Proceedings of the 2nd ACM SIGCOMM Work-
shop on Internet measurement. pp. 71–82. ACM, Marseille, France (2002), URL
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/637201.637210
[6] Barr, R., Haas, Z., van Renesse, R.: JiST: an efficient approach to simulation us-
ing virtual machines. Software Practice and Experience 35(6), 539–576 (2005), URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/spe.647
[7] Becker, M., Drozda, M., Schaust, S., Bohlmann, S., Szczerbicka, H.: On Classification Ap-
proaches for Misbehavior Detection in Wireless Sensor Networks. Journal of Computers 4(5),
357 (2009), URL http://dx.doi.org/10.4304/jcp.4.5.357-365
[8] Bhuse, V., Gupta, A., Lilien, L.: DPDSN: Detection of packet-dropping attacks for wireless
sensor networks. In: Proceedings of the Fourth International Trusted Internet Workshop. Goa,
India (2005)
[9] Datar, M., Immorlica, N., Indyk, P., Mirrokni, V.: Locality-sensitive hashing scheme
based on p-stable distributions. In: Proceedings of the twentieth annual symposium
on Computational geometry. pp. 253–262. ACM New York, NY, USA (2004), URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/997817.997857
[10] D’haeseleer, P., Forrest, S., Helman, P.: An Immunological Approach to Change De-
tection: Algorithms, Analysis and Implications. In: Proc. of IEEE Symposium on Se-
curity and Privacy. pp. 110–119. Los Angeles: IEEE computer society (1996), URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1996.502674
[11] Drozda, M., Schaust, S.: Costimulation and Priming: Can it Help Protect Ad Hoc
Wireless Networks? In: Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Applied
Sciences in Biomedical and Communication Technologies (ISABEL’09) (2009), URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ISABEL.2009.5373649
[12] Drozda, M., Schaust, S., Schildt, S., Szczerbicka, H.: Priming: Making the
Reaction to Intrusion or Fault Predictable. Natural Computing (2010), URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11047-010-9219-8, to appear
23
[13] Drozda, M., Schaust, S., Szczerbicka, H.: AIS for Misbehavior Detection in
Wireless Sensor Networks: Performance and Design Principles. In: Proc. IEEE
Congress on Evolutionary Computation (CEC). pp. 3719–3726 (2007), URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CEC.2007.4424955
[14] Drozda, M., Schaust, S., Szczerbicka, H.: Is AIS Based Misbehavior Detec-
tion Suitable for Wireless Sensor Networks? In: Proc. of IEEE Wireless Com-
munications and Networking Conference (WCNC’07). pp. 3130–3135 (2007), URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/WCNC.2007.578
[15] Drozda, M., Schaust, S., Szczerbicka, H.: Immuno-Inspired Knowledge Man-
agement for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks. In: Smart Information and Knowl-
edge Management, Ngoc Thanh Nguyen and Edward Szczerbicki (Eds.), Stud-
ies in Computational Intelligence, vol. 260, pp. 1–26. Springer (2010), URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04584-4 1
[16] Drozda, M., Schildt, S., Schaust, S., Einhellinger, S., Szczerbicka, H.: A tool for prototyping
AIS based protection systems for ad hoc and sensor networks. Cybernetics and Systems 39(7),
719–742 (2008), URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01969720802257964
[17] Drozda, M., Schildt, S., Schaust, S., Szczerbicka, H.: An Immuno-Inspired Approach to Mis-
behavior Detection in Ad Hoc Wireless Networks. Computing Research Repository (CoRR)
(2010), URL http://arXiv.org/abs/1001.3113
[18] Elberfeld, M., Textor, J.: Efficient Algorithms for String-Based Negative Selection. In: Proc.
of International Conference on Artificial Immune Systems (ICARIS). pp. 109–121 (2009),
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03246-2 14
[19] Feeney, L., Nilsson, M.: Investigating the energy consumption of a wireless net-
work interface in an ad hoc networking environment. In: INFOCOM 2001: Pro-
ceedings of Twentieth Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Com-
munications Societies. vol. 3, pp. 1548–1557. Anchorage, Alaska (2001), URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/INFCOM.2001.916651
[20] Forrest, S., Perelson, A., Allen, L., Cherukuri, R.: Self-nonself discrimination in
a computer. In: Proceedings of IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research
in Security and Privacy. pp. 202–212. Oakland, CA, USA (1994), URL http
//dx.doi.org/10.1109/RISP.1994.296580
[21] Frauwirth, K.A., Thompson, C.B.: Activation and inhibition of lymphocytes by cos-
timulation. The Journal of Clinical Investigation 109(3), 295–299 (2 2002), URL
http://www.jci.org/articles/view/14941
[22] Gama, J., Brazdil, P.: Cascade generalization. Machine Learning 41(3), 315–343 (2000), URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1007652114878
[23] Gonzalez, O., Howarth, M., Pavlou, G.: Detection of packet forwarding misbehavior in mobile
ad-hoc networks. In: Boavida, F., Monteiro, E., Mascolo, S., Koucheryavy, Y. (eds.) Proceed-
ings of the International Conference on Wired/Wireless Internet Communications. Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4517, pp. 302–314. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, Coimbra,
Portugal (2007), URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72697-5 26
24
[24] Hofmeyr, S., Forrest, S.: Immunity by design: An artificial immune system. In: GECCO ’99:
Proceedings of Genetic and Evolutionary Computation Conference. vol. 2, pp. 1289–1296.
Morgan Kaufmann, Orlando, Florida, USA (1999)
[25] Hu, Y., Perrig, A., Johnson, D.: Packet leashes: a defense against wormhole
attacks in wireless networks. In: INFOCOM 2003: Proceedings of the Twenty-
Second Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications So-
cieties. vol. 3, pp. 1976–1986. IEEE, San Francisco, CA, USA (2003), URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/INFCOM.2003.1209219
[26] Hu, Y., Perrig, A., Johnson, D.: Wormhole attacks in wireless networks. IEEE
Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 24(2), 370–380 (2006), URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/JSAC.2005.861394
[27] Huang, Y., Lee, W.: A cooperative intrusion detection system for ad hoc net-
works. In: SASN ’03: Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Security of
ad hoc and sensor networks. pp. 135–147. ACM, Fairfax, Virginia (2003), URL
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/986858.986877
[28] Janeway Jr, C.: The immune system evolved to discriminate infectious non-
self from noninfectious self. Immunology Today 13(1), 11–16 (1992), URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-5699(92)90198-G
[29] Jung, H.W., Tschaplinski, T.J., Wang, L., Glazebrook, J., Greenberg, J.T.:
Priming in Systemic Plant Immunity. Science 324(5923), 89–91 (2009), URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1170025
[30] Kaynak, C., Alpaydin, E.: Multistage cascading of multiple classifiers: One man’s noise is
another man’s data. In: Proc. 17th International Conf. on Machine Learning. pp. 455–462
(2000)
[31] Kohavi, R., John, G.: Wrappers for feature subset selection. Artificial Intelligence 97(1-2),
273–324 (1997), URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0004-3702(97)00043-X
[32] Krishnamurthy, S., Thamilarasu, G., Bauckhage, C.: Malady: A machine
learning-based autonomous decision-making system for sensor networks. In: Proc.
of IEEE International Conference on Computational Science and Engineering.
vol. 2, pp. 93–100. IEEE Computer Society, Vancouver, Canada (2009), URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CSE.2009.246
[33] Le Boudec, J., Sarafijanovic, S.: An Artificial Immune System Approach to Misbehavior
Detection in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks. In: Proc. of Bio-ADIT. pp. 96–111. Springer (2004),
URL http //dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-27835-1 29
[34] Liu, Y., Janeway, C.: Cells that present both specific ligand and costimulatory activity are the
most efficient inducers of clonal expansion of normal CD4 T cells. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 89(9), 3845 (1992)
[35] Mahajan, V., Leskov, I., Chen, J.: Homeostasis of T cell diversity. Cell Mol Immunol 2(1),
1–10 (2005)
25
[36] Marcek, S., Drozda, M., Juhas, G., Lehocki, F.: Network Intrusion Detec-
tion in High Dimensional Space. In: 2nd International Symposium on Applied
Sciences in Biomedical and Communication Technologies (ISABEL) (2009), URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ISABEL.2009.5373652
[37] Marti, S., Giuli, T.J., Lai, K., Baker, M.: Mitigating routing misbehavior in mobile ad hoc
networks. In: MobiCom ’00: Proceedings of the 6th annual international conference onMobile
computing and networking. pp. 255–265. ACM, Boston, Massachusetts, United States (2000),
URL http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/345910.345955
[38] Medzhitov, R., Janeway, C.: Innate immunity: impact on the adaptive im-
mune response. Current opinion in immunology 9(1), 4–9 (1997), URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0952-7915(97)80152-5
[39] Mierswa, I., Wurst, M., Klinkenberg, R., Scholz, M., Euler, T.: Yale: Rapid prototyping for
complex data mining tasks. In: Proceedings of the 12th ACM SIGKDD international confer-
ence on Knowledge discovery and data mining. pp. 935–940. ACM, Philadelphia, PA, USA
(2006)
[40] Piccirillo, C., Thornton, A.: Cornerstone of peripheral tolerance: naturally occurring
CD4+ CD25+ regulatory T cells. Trends in immunology 25(7), 374–380 (2004), URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.it.2004.04.009
[41] Sarafijanovic, S., Le Boudec, J.Y.: An artificial immune system for misbehavior detection in
mobile ad-hoc networks with virtual thymus, clustering, danger signal, and memory detec-
tors. In: Nicosia, G., Cutello, V., Bentley, P.J., Timmis, J. (eds.) ICARIS ’04: Proceedings
of the International Conference on Artificial Immune Systems. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol. 3239, pp. 342–356. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, Catania, Sicily (2004), URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30220-9 28
[42] Schaust, S., Drozda, M.: Influence of Network Payload and Traffic Models on the Detection
Performance of AIS. In: Procedings of International Symposium on Performance Evaluation
of Computer and Telecommunication Systems (SPECTS). pp. 44–51. IEEE Press, Edinburgh,
UK (2008)
[43] Szor, P.: The art of computer virus research and defense. Addison-Wesley Professional (2005)
[44] Vaidya, N., Hameed, S.: Scheduling data broadcast in asymmetric com-
munication environments. Wireless Networks 5(3), 171–182 (1999), URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1019142809816
[45] Yegneswaran, V., Barford, P., Ullrich, J.: Internet intrusions: global characteristics and preva-
lence. In: SIGMETRICS ’03: Proceedings of the 2003 ACM SIGMETRICS international con-
ference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems. pp. 138–147. ACM, San Diego,
CA, USA (2003), URL http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/781027.781045
26
